



**Vatnik Soup Italia** @Vatniksoup\_it

Apr 17, 2024 · 27 tweets · [Vatniksoup\\_it/status/1780599650908860544](https://twitter.com/Vatniksoup_it/status/1780599650908860544)

Nella #vatniksoup di oggi parleremo del metodo russo di propaganda e disinformazione online, il "Firehose of Falsehood" (L'idrante di falsità). È una strategia comunemente usata dal Cremlino per le operazioni di informazione, che spesso privilegia la quantità alla qualità.

1/25

## **L'idrante di falsità: il metodo russo di propaganda in un'epoca di abbondanza informativa**

- Elevata quantità e approccio multicanale
- Spudorata volontà di trasmettere falsità
- Nessun impegno o richiesta di coerenza
- Messaggi rapidi, continui e ripetitivi
- L'obiettivo non è persuadere, ma confondere e travolgere
- Assume un ambiente con poca fiducia e la riduce ulteriormente
- Numero degli argomenti vale più della loro qualità
- Soffocare messaggi alternativi e concorrenti con la sola quantità

Il termine è stato coniato da Paul & Matthews nel loro articolo del 2016, "The Russian "Firehose of Falsehood" Propaganda Model".

Questo nome è basato su due caratteristiche: 1) un approccio multicanale ad alto volume e 2) la volontà spudorata di diffondere disinformazione.

2/25

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## The Russian "Firehose of Falsehood" Propaganda Model


### Why It Might Work and Options to Counter It

by Christopher Paul, Miriam Matthews

Related Topics: Information Operations, The Internet, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Russia, United States

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**Perspective**

The Russian "Firehose of Falsehood" Propaganda Model

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Russian language version

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نموذج الدعاية الروسية: "خراطيم الكذب"

Arabic language version

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DOI: <https://doi.org/10.7249/PE198>

Document Number: PE-198-OSD

Year: 2016

Series: Perspectives

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L'accademico Giorgio Bertolin ha descritto la disinformazione russa come divertente, confusa e travolgente.

L'approccio ad elevata quantità e multicanale significa che questi agenti cercano di controllare la narrazione su ogni principale social media.



La Russia ha condotto e conduce queste operazioni su Facebook, Twitter, TikTok, Telegram, VKontakte, YouTube e persino su Tinder.


Il volume di queste operazioni non va sottovalutato:

4/25

## Russian spies use Tinder to recruit German politicians and military

April 16, 2023, 01:40 PM 575

Share: [Facebook](#) [Twitter](#) [Telegram](#) [Email](#)



Russian spies use Tinder to recruit German politicians and military (Photo:CatSnobby/Twitter)

**Dating app Tinder is widely used by Russian intelligence for spying and recruiting politicians and military in Germany, German newspaper Welt am Sonntag reported on April 15.**

# Russian 'smash-and-grab' social media operation on Facebook and Instagram attempting to influence Ukraine war - Meta report

Many fake accounts pushing Russian views on the invasion have been blocked, while Meta has also limited the reach of state controlled media. Independent researchers welcome the changes but say disinformation from other sources is left "virtually unchecked".



**Sanya Burgess**  
Digital investigations journalist @sanyaburgess

🕒 Thursday 23 February 2023 13:04, UK

Già nel 2015, più di 1000 troll stipendiati lavoravano alla Internet Research Agency (IRA) di Yevgeny Prigozhin, la più nota troll farm della Russia, e ognuno aveva una quota giornaliera di 100 commenti. 5/25



**RELATED ARTICLE**  
Yahoo: Russian trolls watched 'House of Cards' to learn about US politics

A short time later, it began advertising for staff on a headhunting site (hh.ru). One post looking for a copywriter says the job involves "writing diverse texts for the Internet and content for social networks." The posting offered a salary of 30,000 rubles a month (then a little over \$500) and said experience was unnecessary. Recruits would work with a team of "young and enthusiastic colleagues" in "a comfortable and stylish office," according to the posting.

That's not how Ludmila Savchuk remembers IRA, where she worked for two months in 2015. She told CNN a card system restricted access to other floors and employees were always under camera surveillance.

"Employees are not really allowed to talk to each other," she said.

Savchuk says she estimates that now "there are about 1,000 people working at Savushkina Street. And this is just one building." She believes other employees work remotely.

Another former employee, interviewed anonymously by the independent Russian TV network RAIN this week, said: "There was a goal - to influence opinions, to lead to a discussion. ... There was a strategy document. It was necessary to know all the main problems of the United States of America. Tax problems, the problem of gays, sexual minorities, weapons."

The former employee said the mission was to "get into the dispute yourself to fire it up, try to rock the boat." He gave an example: "It was necessary to write that sodomy is a sin. This would always get you a couple of dozen likes."

He said IRA made its employees watch the US TV series "House of Cards" to improve their English.

Not unlike the fictional White House of Frank Underwood, Savchuk says, "The atmosphere there reminded me of some anti-utopian Gulag."

Da allora questi numeri sono probabilmente aumentati di molto e molti altri Paesi usano le troll farm per condurre campagne politiche o diffondere propaganda.

Uno dei casi più famosi di manipolazione sociale è stata l'influenza dei social media sull'omicidio di Khashoggi.

6/25

We also identified a long list of international actors apparently benefiting from the publicity generated by the same manipulation providers.

- Head of a Saudi government agency (Twitter).
- Advisor to the Saudi Royal Court (Twitter).
- A Lebanese journalist (Twitter).
- A number of accounts associated with the National Council of Resistance of Iran (Twitter).
- A prominent Venezuelan politician (Twitter).
- Various accounts from public figures in Indonesia, Egypt, Brazil (Twitter).
- A member of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (TikTok).
- A Turkish mayor (YouTube).
- A Ukrainian deputy mayor (YouTube).
- An Indian computer science professor (YouTube).
- A member of the Hong Kong Legislative Council (YouTube).
- A Nigerian firebrand pastor (YouTube).
- One dentist, a health guru, a number of medical clinics (YouTube).
- The director of a Ukrainian pet food business (Facebook).
- A former Ukrainian president (Facebook).
- A former Ukrainian government minister (Facebook).
- A member of the Italian senate (Facebook).

MEDITERRANEAN POLITICS  
2021, VOL. 26, NO. 2, 247-259  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2019.1697089>

 **Routledge**  
Taylor & Francis Group



## Framing a murder: Twitter influencers and the Jamal Khashoggi incident

Alexei Abrahams <sup>a</sup> and Andrew Leber<sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup>Open Technology Fund Research Fellow at Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada; <sup>b</sup>Department of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA

### ABSTRACT

Social media have played a significant role in political discourse across the Mediterranean in recent years. In this research note, we showcase the usefulness of social media data for political analysis by focusing on the main Arabic Twitter hashtag following the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul, October 2018. We collect a sample of almost 2.4 million tweets posted by nearly 370,000 Twitter accounts. We show that just 281 accounts drove 80% of the discourse, and that these accounts can be reliably clustered into separate ideological camps representing different social forces of Egyptian, Turkish, European, and Gulf origin, arrayed against or in support of Saudi Arabia's regional agenda.

**KEYWORDS** Social media; Polarization; Community Detection; Process Tracing; Mixed Methods

Questi troll lavorano a turni, e il lavoro va avanti ogni giorno 24 ore su 24. Una descrizione migliore di questi sfruttati sarebbe quella di fabbrica di troll, dal momento che hanno trasformato il trolling in una catena di montaggio di propaganda e disinformazione.

7/25



L'elevata quantità si accompagna alla volontà di diffondere disinformazione. La Russia utilizza spesso la strategia di "lanciare merda contro il muro per vedere cosa resta attaccato", spingendo centinaia di narrazioni contraddittorie e false,...

8/25

**TCH** ALL PUBLICATIONS THE BEST ON YOUTUBE TSN EXCLUSIVE UKRAINE POLITICS **WAR** GLAMOR PROSPORT LADY HEALTH

TCH > War

## Novel Military Tool: Russia Issued a Statement about Research of "Combat Insects" and "Combat Bats" in Ukraine that Allegedly Will Be Used against Invaders (Video)

 Vira Hmelnicka 19:34, 28.10.22 ⌚ 2 min

Share:      



Photo: Getty Images

...solo per vedere se qualcuna guadagna trazione.

Alcuni esempi di narrazioni dimenticate sono: Zelenskyy che lascia Kyiv dopo l'inizio dell'invasione, la base segreta della NATO a Mariupol, i polacchi che tentano di far esplodere un serbatoio di cloro,...

9/25



ANALYTICS

## Combat mosquitoes, a dirty bomb and Zelensky's escape. Top 10 most absurd fakes invented by the Russian propaganda

09.01.2023



...gli uccelli come armi biologiche, le zanzare da combattimento, l'uso di bombe sporche e l'adorazione di Satana da parte degli ucraini.

Le Troll Farm spesso "prendono in prestito" idee e narrazioni dai cospirazionisti.

10/25



World - Analysis

## How a QAnon conspiracy theory about Ukraine bioweapons became mainstream disinformation



It started as a fringe belief. Now it's an official stated reason for Russia's invasion



[Justin Ling](#) · for CBC News · Posted: Apr 10, 2022 4:00 AM EDT | Last Updated: April 13, 2022





## Thread



**Clandestine**  
@WarClandestine

1) HOLY SHIT! I think I may be onto something about [#Ukraine](#).

Zelensky said the Russians are firing at “military installations”. How broad is that term?

I am seeing speculation that could include US installed biolabs.

At first I was like no way.


Then I started digging.

### US BIOLABS IN UKRAINE



Tweet your reply





Un esempio di ciò è stata la teoria del "laboratorio di armi biologiche" avviata da un seguace di QAnon, Jacob Creech. Questa narrazione è stata diffusa, insieme al Cremlino, da persone come Tucker Carlson e Steve Bannon. In Italia è stata rilanciata da Rete 4 La7 e RAI 1.

11/25



Inoltre, non c'è alcun impegno in un qualche tipo di coerenza e queste narrazioni possono naturalmente essere contraddittorie - come ho detto, l'obiettivo non è quello di persuadere, ma di confondere e travolgere.

12/25

Molte delle "argomentazioni" di questi troll si concentrano su evidenze aneddotiche o fonti falsificate. Un buon esempio sono le risposte con "nazisti ucraini" che inondano la discussione con collage di immagini aneddotiche di ucraini con bandiere o tatuaggi nazisti.

13/25

REUTERS FACT CHECK JUNE 30, 2022 / 8:53 PM / UPDATED 10 MONTHS AGO

## Fact Check-Photo of man with Nazi tattoos does not show Ukrainian prisoner of war

By Reuters Fact Check

3 MIN READ




An image of a military officer examining a young man with Nazi tattoos has been shared online in June 2022 with a message falsely saying it shows a Ukrainian prisoner of war in Donetsk, Ukraine. The photograph was taken in Belarus in June 2005.

Users shared screenshots of a now-deleted tweet that read: "Another laotian buddhist monk - ukrop Pow is being treated in Donetsk."

Examples of the claim shared online can be viewed ([here](#)), ([here](#)), ([here](#)), and ([here](#)).

The image is not recent, however, nor was it taken in Ukraine.

A reverse image search reveals that the image is viewable on Getty Images, captioned: "MOGILYEV, BELARUS: A Belarus prison doctor examines a prisoner covered with Nazi tattoos at the 15th prison in the town of Mogilyev, some 200 kms from Minsk, 22 June 2005. Some 4000 prisoners were released according to the amnesty granted for the 60th anniversary of the end of WWII and some 5,000 will be released within one year. AFP PHOTO / VIKTOR DRACHEV ([here](#)).

Inoltre l'idrante utilizza spesso materiale senza fonti e fuori contesto. L'uso di immagini (false) è un modo efficace per suscitare reazioni ed emozioni forti. A volte la Russia produce video fabbricati, ma ne ha fatti meno dopo che diversi sono stati geolocalizzati in .

RUSSIA

# Russia Caught Red-Handed Making Fake Video of Ukrainian Attack on Woman and Child

NICE TRY

Russia's latest dubious evidence of Nazis was unmasked as a clumsy fake by one of the propaganda outlets that first spread it.



Allison Quinn  
News Editor

Updated Mar. 28, 2023 9:14AM ET / Published Mar. 28, 2023 9:13AM ET



Questa strategia funziona molto bene nei cosiddetti ambienti a bassa fiducia, ovvero in Paesi o società in cui la fiducia nei confronti di politici, giornalisti e autorità è relativamente bassa. Naturalmente l'uso efficace di questo metodo peggiora ulteriormente la fiducia.


15/25

## Americans' Trust in Mass Media, by Political Party

In general, how much trust and confidence do you have in the mass media -- such as newspapers, TV and radio -- when it comes to reporting the news fully, accurately and fairly -- a great deal, a fair amount, not very much or none at all?

% Great deal/Fair amount

— Republicans — Independents — Democrats




Data from 1972, 1974 and 1976 not shown

GALLUP

# Where Trust In The News Is Highest & Lowest

% agreeing "you can trust news most of the time" in selected countries in 2021\*



\* Research was conducted online by YouGov in January & February 2021. 2,000 respondents in each market.

Source: Reuters Institute Digital News Report




statista

L'enorme numero di messaggi e di commenti fa passare in secondo piano qualsiasi altra argomentazione o punto di vista, e spesso rende obsoleto qualsiasi tipo di fact-checking: dopo che l'informazione è stata smentita, l'argomento è già cambiato molte, molte volte.

# #UkraineFacts

By the International Fact-checking Network Signatories

Developed by Maldita.es



Ed è proprio per questo che #NAFO è stata così efficiente contro questa particolare strategia, perché la contrasta con misure simili. Risposte in grande quantità e senza senso da parte di stupidi cani meme... 17/25

**Ukraine Memes for NATO Teens** @LivFaustDi... · Jun 19, 2022

Replying to @Amb\_Ulyanov

You: "we have to bomb all of Ukraine's civilians because Ukraine was fighting an internal war and some civilians got shelled"

**Mikhail Ulyanov** @Amb\_Ulyanov · Follow


Russia government official

You pronounced this nonsense. Not me.

7:42 PM · Jun 19, 2022


...soffoca molto bene l'idrante di falsità e, in più, ridicolizza le principali fonti della narrazione filorussa, inclusi l'ex presidente del Paese, e gli account delle ambasciate e dei diplomatici.

18/25



Come per la maggior parte delle attività di produzione, la propaganda è stata esternalizzata verso fonti più economiche. Oggi molte di queste fattorie di troll sono state trasferite da luoghi come la Russia e la Macedonia in vari Paesi africani, come la Nigeria e il Ghana.





## Inside a Russian troll factory in Ghana



Working with researchers from Clemson University, CNN has found a Russian troll operation targeting American voters and, for the first time, we have confronted the people on the ground behind it -- and it's not where you might expect. With help from Facebook and Twitter, who had already been investigating some of these accounts and who corroborated our findings - this is a never-before seen look at how Russia is once again trying to influence America's democracy. CNN's Clarissa Ward reports.

07:30 - Source: [CNN](#)

La Cina ha usato l'idrante per la sua propaganda; la sua troll farm più famosa è l'Esercito di 50 Cent. La differenza maggiore tra le operazioni russe e quelle cinesi è che i cinesi si sono concentrate sui canali nazionali, trascurando il mondo online fuori dalla Cina.

20/25

SIGN IN / UP The Register

SECURITY This article is more than 1 year old

## When it comes to hacking societies, Russia remains the master at sowing discord and disinformation online

53

China can't hold a candle to GRU's shenanigans, says expert

Shaun Nichols in San Francisco Thu 6 Aug 2020 21:49 UTC

**BLACK HAT** While China is the *bête noire du jour* of the US government, Russia is the master of spreading disinformation, fostering conflict, and derailing discourse online, the Black Hat security conference was told today.

At her Thursday keynote, Stanford Internet Observatory's research manager Renee DiResta [explained](#) how Russian military intelligence – the GRU – and the private Internet Research Agency (IRA) were putting the likes of China to shame. Security companies and government agencies have good reason to move their focus from Beijing to Moscow, she warned.

The basic methods of hacking public opinion are fairly simple, DiResta explained. Fake accounts generate content and spam it out on social media to amplify the message. If enough real people pick up and the posts go viral the mainstream media kicks in and amplifies the desired message still further.

In Russia's case, it spreads divisive material, stolen information, and fake news in an attempt to turn Americans against each other, sour civil society, sow doubt, and create distractions, leaving people unsure of what's really going on. This worked. In China's case, it tried to make people like China. This didn't work.

October 07, 2016 2:50  
AM  
Joyce Lau

## Who Are the Chinese Trolls of the '50 Cent Army'?

Share



Print



FILE - Customers surf the Internet at an Internet cafe in Beijing, China.

La Russia, inoltre, si concentra maggiormente sulla critica e sulla colpevolizzazione degli altri, mentre la Cina sull'elogiare il PCC. Dopo aver constatato il successo della Russia nelle sue operazioni di informazione, però, anche la Cina ha iniziato a usare...

21/25

TEA LEAF NATION

## Meet the Chinese Trolls Pumping Out 488 Million Fake Social Media Posts

New research exposes a "massive secretive operation" to fill China's internet with propaganda.

By David Wertime



...strategie più aggressive contro i suoi rivali, soprattutto contro gli USA.

Secondo la BBC, gli account di propaganda russa e cinese stanno "prosperando" su Twitter dopo che @elonmusk ha licenziato il team che li contrastava.

22/25



The image is a screenshot of a BBC News article. At the top, the BBC logo is on the left, followed by a 'Sign in' button and navigation links for 'Home', 'News', 'Sport', 'Reel', and 'Worklife'. Below this is a red banner with the word 'NEWS' in white. Underneath the banner is a secondary navigation bar with links for 'Home', 'War in Ukraine', 'Coronation', 'Climate', 'Video', 'World', 'UK', 'Business', 'Tech', and 'Science'. The 'Tech' link is underlined. The main headline reads 'Twitter staff cuts leave Russian trolls unchecked'. Below the headline, it says '14 April'. There is a red square icon with a white arrow pointing left, followed by the text 'Social media regulation debate'. The main image is a large black silhouette of the Twitter bird logo mounted on a brick wall. A 'REUTERS' watermark is visible in the bottom left corner of the image.

Si presume che il sistema attuale si basi completamente su sistemi di rilevamento automatici.

@DarrenLinville, professore associato dell'Università di Clemson, ha dichiarato che una di queste reti sembra provenire dall'IRA (Internet Research Agency).

23/25

MOTHERBOARD  
TECH BY VICE

# VIDEO: Ukraine Busts Alleged Russian Bot Farm Using Thousands of SIM Cards

Photo and videos reveal machines running 18,000 fake social media accounts.

By [Matthew Gault](#)

February 9, 2022, 10:17pm [Share](#) [Tweet](#) [Save](#)

Listen to this article




IMAGE: UKRAINE SECURITY SERVICES PHOTO.

Ukraine's Security Service said it has shut down a troll farm in the city of Lviv.

"The SSU cyber specialists uncovered and dismantled two bot farms in Lviv with a total capacity of 18,000 fake accounts," an SSU [press release](#) said. "According to preliminary information, organizers from



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04.26.23

Per saperne di più sull'IRA:

Sono stati identificati anche troll farm provenienti dal campo opposto, con tweet a sostegno dell'Ucraina e di Alexei Navalny.

24/25

[https://twitter.com/P\\_Kallioniemi/status/1590238211527217152](https://twitter.com/P_Kallioniemi/status/1590238211527217152)

Now, a new group of Russian trolls is active on Twitter.

It supports Putin's war in Ukraine, ridicules Kyiv and the West, and attacks independent Russian-language publications, including the BBC Russian Service. Many of these trolls' accounts have been suspended, but dozens are still active.

Darren Linvill, associate professor at the Clemson University Media Forensics Hub in South Carolina, says the network appears to originate from Prigozhin's troll factory.

Mr Linvill and his colleagues have also discovered two similar Russian-language troll networks, but from an opposite camp. One tweets in support of Ukraine, and another promotes Russian opposition, including the jailed Putin critic Alexey Navalny.

While they have all the markings of troll accounts, including random numbers in the Twitter handles and coordinated behaviour, these networks appear to remain undetected by the platform.

The Clemson University team is also tracking pro-Chinese accounts targeting users in both Chinese and English about issues of importance to the Chinese government.

With only a skeleton crew remaining, Twitter does not have resources to swiftly detect, attribute and take down this foreign propaganda, according to former employees.

While the platform also established partnerships with research institutions that detected information operations, scholars say they have not heard anything from Twitter since November.

Prima che Musk prendesse il controllo del sito, Twitter era relativamente efficace nel rimuovere gli account delle troll farm, ma si può solo supporre che non sia più così.

Come da tradizione, i giganti dei social media danno priorità ai profitti rispetto alla sicurezza.

25/25

	2020	2021
Facebook	96.53%	98.52%
Twitter	74.23%	83.43%
Instagram	91.80%	96.01%
TikTok	99.69%	84.77%
Vkontakte		99.96%
YouTube	97.17%	92.38%

Table 2: Percentage of inauthentic activity remaining on the platforms after four weeks.

Potete approfondire il funzionamento dell'attività dei troll e delle troll farm nel libro di @martaottaviani "Brigate russe: la guerra occulta del Cremlino tra troll e hacker" - insieme alle altre attività che fanno parte della guerra ibrida e non lineare.

<https://www.amazon.it/Brigate-Russe-guerra-occulta-Cremlino/dp/885526558X>

@martaottaviani Trovi tutte le nostre zuppe - in italiano e non - su: [vatniksoup.com/it/zuppe/](http://vatniksoup.com/it/zuppe/)

