




Vatniksoep in het Nederlands (officieel) @vatniksoep_nl

Jun 11, 2024 · 26 tweets · [vatniksoep_nl/status/1800506576991838700](https://twitter.com/vatniksoep_nl/status/1800506576991838700)

1. Vandaag een draadje over Rusland en hoe het al op verschillende manieren probeert Oekraïens grondgebied te veroveren. Het is een geschiedenis die veel analisten niet kennen maar wel essentieel is om de situatie in Oekraïne te begrijpen.
2. De onafhankelijkheid van Oekraïne werd van kracht op 24 augustus 1991. Korte tijd later werden verdragen getekend over meer praktische zaken met o.a. het leasen van de haven van Sevastopol voor de Russische Zwarte Zee vloot.



3. Al vrij snel besloot Rusland dat te schenden. De Supreme Soviet, een van de hoogste politieke organen in Rusland riep Sevastpol uit tot permanent Russisch grondgebied.

The representative of Ukraine contended that the “irresponsible” decision by the Russian Parliament could only be described as a “flagrant flouting” of the fundamental principles and norms of international law, in particular Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations. It constituted a clear encroachment on Ukraine’s territorial inviolability, a revision of existing boundaries, interference in its internal affairs and was, in both spirit and letter, incompatible with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. The decision was also a flagrant violation of the international commitments flowing from the Russian Federation’s membership in the United Nations, its participation in CSCE, and the Kiev Treaty. The decree was, in essence, a “time bomb” which should not be understated. He warned that, if the Russian authorities attempted to implement it, Ukraine might be forced to take “appropriate actions” to defend its sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability, which could have unforeseeable consequences and seriously threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. Invoking Article 34 of the Charter, the speaker

The **Supreme Soviet** (Russian: Верховный Совет, *romanized: Verkhovny Sovet*, lit. 'Supreme Council') was the common name for the **legislative bodies** (parliaments) of the **Soviet socialist republics** (SSR) in the **Union of Soviet Socialist Republics** (USSR). These soviets were modeled after the **Supreme Soviet of the USSR**, established in 1938, and were nearly identical.^[1]

Party-approved delegates to the Supreme Soviets were periodically elected unopposed in **show elections**.^[2] The **first free or semi-free elections** took place during *perestroika* in late 1980s, in which Supreme Soviets themselves were no longer **directly elected**. Instead, Supreme Soviets were appointed by directly-elected **Congresses of People's Deputies** based somewhat on the **Congresses of Soviets** that preceded the Supreme Soviets. The soviets until then were largely **rubber-stamp** institutions, approving decisions handed to them by the **Communist Party of the USSR** or of each SSR.^[2]

4. Dit leidde uiteraard tot spanningen, Oekraïne kaartte de zaak op internationaal niveau aan bij de Veiligheidsraad over de Russische schendingen van haar territoriale integriteit.

**Decision of 20 July 1993 (3256th meeting):
statement by the President**

By a letter dated 16 July 1993 addressed to the President of the Security Council,¹ the representative of Ukraine transmitted to the Council the text of a letter dated 14 July 1993 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, addressed to the President of the Council, requesting an urgent meeting of the Security Council, to consider the situation which had been created as a result of the adoption, on 9 July 1993, of a decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation concerning the Ukrainian city of Sevastopol. The decree cited “Russian federal status for the city of Sevastopol within the administrative and territorial borders of the city district as of December 1991”, and entrusted the Russian Government with the task of working out a State programme to ensure the status of Sevastopol.

In his letter, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine stated that the Supreme Soviet’s action was in flagrant disregard of universally recognized principles and norms of international law, in particular Article 2 (4) of the Charter. It also constituted an overt encroachment on the territorial inviolability of Ukraine, an interference in its internal and external affairs, and was incompatible with the aims and principles of the United Nations. The letter concluded by rejecting any territorial claims and appealed to the Security Council to use its full authority to have the “illegal decision” cancelled by the Parliament of the Russian Federation and to warn it against taking further decisions, which could jeopardize international

5. Die territoriale integriteit was in principe al lang geregeld. Rusland was erfgenaam van de Helsinki akkoorden uit '78, er was het Budapest Memorandum uit '94 en de onafhankelijkheidsverklaring. Toch werd er in 1995 een tijdelijke regeling getroffen.

The **Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances** comprises three substantially identical political agreements signed at the [OSCE](#) conference in [Budapest, Hungary](#), on 5 December 1994, to provide security assurances by its signatories relating to the accession of [Belarus](#), [Kazakhstan](#) and [Ukraine](#) to the [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons](#) (NPT). The three memoranda were originally signed by three nuclear powers: [Russia](#), the [United States](#) and the [United Kingdom](#).^[1] [China](#) and [France](#) gave somewhat weaker individual assurances in separate documents.^[2]

The memoranda, signed in Patria Hall at the [Budapest Convention Center](#) with US Ambassador [Donald M. Blinken](#) amongst others in attendance,^[3] prohibited Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom from threatening or using military force or economic coercion against Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, "except in self-defence or otherwise in accordance with the [Charter of the United Nations](#)." As a result of other agreements and the memorandum, between 1993 and 1996, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine gave up their nuclear weapons.^{[4][5]}

The **Helsinki Final Act**, also known as **Helsinki Accords** or **Helsinki Declaration** was the document signed at the closing meeting of the third phase of the [Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe](#) (CSCE) held in [Helsinki, Finland](#), between 30 July and 1 August 1975, following two years of negotiations known as the Helsinki Process.^[1] All then-existing [European countries](#) except [Andorra](#) and [Hoxhaist Albania](#), as well as the [United States](#) and [Canada](#) (altogether 35 participating states), signed the Final Act in an attempt to improve the [détente](#) between the [East](#) and the [West](#). The Helsinki Accords, however, were not binding as they did not have [treaty](#) status that would have to be ratified by parliaments.^[2] Sometimes the term "Helsinki pact(s)" was also used unofficially.^[3]

6. In 1994 pleegt de Russisch georiënteerde Yuri Meshkov een coup op de Krim, hij verwerpt de Oekraïense grondwet en roept de Krim uit tot onafhankelijk met verdere intenties later bij Rusland aan te sluiten.

In the 1980s, Yuri Meshkov worked at the Prosecutor's Office of Crimea, then became a lawyer. In 1990, he was elected a deputy of the Crimean Regional Council
①. Meshkov was more radical than other, generally pro-Russian Crimean deputies. Since 1991, his Republican Party of Crimea has demanded a referendum on the independence of the peninsula and held regular pro-Russian rallies, at which Meshkov called for separatism and against the Crimean Tatars returning home.

In October 1993, the Supreme Council of Crimea created a new position — "President of the Republic of Crimea", although it did not have the authority to do so. In January 1994, the "presidential" elections were held, in which Meshkov won, gaining 72.9% of the votes in the second round. Most of the other candidates were also pro-Russian. Meshkov did not have a clear political program, except for pro-Russian, anti-Ukrainian and anti-Tatar slogans. The Ukrainian authorities did not interfere in the openly separatist politics of the local Crimean leadership.

7. Het brengt Oekraïne in een lastig parket. Als het militair zou ingrijpen was de kans groot geweest dat Rusland 'te hulp' zou komen. Rusland deed dat eerder bij conflicten in Abchazië en Transnistrië. De Russische 'vredeasmachten' verlieten het grondgebied nooit.

The conflicts related to the two separatist regions in Georgia—Abkhazia and South Ossetia—has its origins in Soviet and pre-Soviet politics in the (South) Caucasus. In total, over 80 ethnic groups live in Georgia, the largest, and politically most significant, ones being Georgians, Armenians, Russians, Abkhaz and South Ossetians (Cornell 2001: 63). Since 1988, Georgia has experienced two violent ethnic conflicts, as well as a short two-phase civil war (Cornell 2001: 75). The latter was between different political factions struggling over control of the Georgian state, while the former were essentially the result of increasingly aggressive Georgian nationalism during, and after, the dying days of the Soviet Union. Both Abkhazia and South Ossetia had enjoyed substantial autonomy throughout the Soviet period and even though the population of both regions was ethnically mixed, it was not until the intensification of Georgian nationalism from the late-1980s onwards that tensions emerged. The nationalist movement in Georgia became further radicalised after Soviet troops crushed a demonstration in April 1989. Calls for independence, the legal proclamation of Georgian as the only official language in August 1989, and Georgia referendum on independence and the subsequent election of nationalist leader Zviad Gamsakhurdia in May 1991 provide the background against which these tensions escalated into full-scale violent conflict: Abkhaz and South Ossetians wanted to preserve, and remain within, the Soviet Union considering their survival as ethno-cultural communities distinct from the Georgian majority to be in acute danger in an independent Georgian state (Cohen 2002, Coppieters 1999, Wennmann 2006). *South Ossetia* South Ossetians belong to the same ethnic group as the people of North Ossetia (now an autonomous republic of Russia which is considered to be the indigenous homeland of Ossetians). A (South) Ossetian presence in contemporary Georgia only dates back a few hundred years (Cornell 2001: 96), and is often used by Georgian nationalists to dispute any rights of South Ossetians to the territory in which they live. In

On June 28, 2023, the documentary film "[Crimes. Liberation](#)" about a little-known special operation of the SBU in 1994 was aired. A year before that, the Supreme Council of Crimea, taking advantage of the general legal chaos, created the position of the President of Crimea. He became the pro-Russian politician Yuriy Meshkov, who closely cooperated with the FSB. Meshkov began to gradually increase his influence — by the beginning of 1994, he already controlled the Crimean militia. In the spring of that year, he decided to put his man at the head of the Crimean SBU (Security Service of Ukraine). After that, President Leonid Kravchuk allowed the SBU to conduct a special operation, which was the beginning of the end for Meshkov and his ambitions. Direct participants in the operation — combat officers, as well as Yevhen Marchuk, who was the head of the SBU at the time — tell about those events in the film. Babel editor Dmytro Raevsky watched the film and briefly recounts the main events of May 1994 in Crimea.

8. Over de situatie in Abchazië werd in 1993 het Sochi verdrag getekend wat voorzeg in terugtrekking van Russische troepen. In 1999 beloofde Rusland in een PACE verdrag troepen terug te halen uit Transnistrië tegen 2001. Het gebeurde alleen nooit...

In October 1992, the Abkhaz side violated the previous ceasefire agreement and launched an [offensive on Gagra](#). The Georgian government saw the role of resolution passed by the Russia's parliament in resuming the conflict, and blamed "reactionary forces" in Russia for encouraging the Abkhaz offensive. ^{[[citation needed](#)]} The action, in which Russian commanders were suspected to have aided to the attackers, also resulted in a significant deterioration of the Georgian-Russian relations. Previously, the Russian military offered protection to the retreating Abkhaz detachments during the summer 1992 Georgian offensive. ^{[[citation needed](#)]} In November 1992, the Russian Air Force conducted heavy air strikes against the villages and towns in Abkhazia predominantly populated by Georgians. In response, the Georgian Defense Ministry accused Russia for the first time in public of preparing a war against Georgia in Abkhazia. This led to the Georgian attacks on targets under Russian and Abkhaz control and the retaliation from the Russian forces. ^[61]

The 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit Decisions on Moldova and Georgia: Prospects for Implementation

OVERVIEW

In a recent seminar at the Kennan Institute, a panel of experts discussed the prospects for implementation of the 1999 OSCE Istanbul summit decisions committing Russia to withdrawing its military forces from Moldova and Georgia by December 31, 2002. The consensus of the panel was that Russia would not succeed in fulfilling its obligations by the deadline, but progress has been made and, given Russia's continued commitment to the goals of the 1999 decision, the prospects for further progress are good. Nevertheless, Russia's failure to meet the deadline is of serious concern, and not only to Moldova and Georgia.

9. Hoewel Rusland officieel aangeeft dat de Krim Oekraïens is zijn er ook andere geluiden zoals die van de Moskou burgemeester Lushkov die de coup steunt. Na 1994 lobbyt Lushkov dan weer dat Sevastopol Russisch grondgebied moet blijven.

Moscow mayor [Yuriy Luzhkov](#) campaigned to claim the city of Sevastopol which [housed the fleet](#), and in December 1996 the Russian [Federation Council](#) officially endorsed the claim.^[6] Spurred by these territorial claims, Ukraine proposed a "special partnership" with NATO in January 1997.^[6]

10. Als drukmiddel zegt Oekraïne daarom in 1997 een speciale status bij de NAVO te willen voor haar bescherming. Het stond met het Budapest Memorandum immers haar kernwapens af. Zo ver komt het niet Rusland en Oekraïne maken nieuwe afspraken.

11. Uiteindelijk sluit Oekraïne twee verdragen met Rusland in '97. De eerste is Het Vriendschaps Verdrag over het respect voor elkaars grenzen en verdere samenwerking. Een tweede verdrag "The Partition Treaty" die gaat over hoe beide marines De Krim gebruiken als basis.

The **Partition Treaty on the Status and Conditions of the Black Sea Fleet** consists of three bilateral agreements^[2] between [Russia](#) and [Ukraine](#) signed on 28 May 1997 whereby the two countries established two independent national fleets, divided armaments and bases between them,^{[3][4]} and set forth conditions for basing of the Russian [Black Sea Fleet](#) in [Crimea](#). The treaty was supplemented by provisions in the [Russian-Ukrainian Friendship Treaty](#), which was signed three days later. Russia unilaterally terminated the Partition Treaty in 2014 after it [annexed Crimea](#).

The **Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation** was an agreement between [Ukraine](#) and [Russia](#), signed in 1997, which fixed the principle of strategic partnership, the recognition of the inviolability of existing borders, and respect for [territorial integrity](#) and mutual commitment not to use its territory to harm the security of each other. The treaty prevents Ukraine and Russia from invading one another's country respectively, and declaring war.^[2] Due to the beginning of the [Russo-Ukrainian War](#) in 2014, Ukraine announced its intention not to renew the treaty in September 2018.^[3] The treaty consequently expired on 31 March 2019.^{[4][3]} The treaty was also known as the "Big Treaty".^{[5][6]}

Until 2019, the treaty was automatically renewed on each 10th anniversary of its signing, unless one party advised the other of its intention to end the treaty six months prior to the date of the renewal.^{[1][7]}

[Russia–Ukraine relations](#) have deteriorated since the [2014 Russian annexation of Crimea](#) and Russian support for [separatist forces in the war](#) in Ukraine's [Donbas](#) region.^[8] In response, [Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko](#) signed a decree not to extend the treaty.

12 Ook de NAVO en Rusland sluiten in '97 een verdrag. In Parijs komen de machtsblokken samenwerkingen overeen. Ook wordt afgesproken dat beide blijvend inspanning zullen leveren tot behoud van vrede op het Europese continent.

Founding Act

on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation signed in Paris, France

27 May. 1997 - | Last updated: 12 Oct. 2009 17:48

English | German | French | Russian | Ukrainian

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The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its member States, on the one hand, and the Russian Federation, on the other hand, hereinafter referred to as NATO and Russia, based on an enduring political commitment undertaken at the highest political level, will build together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the principles of democracy and cooperative security.

NATO and Russia do not consider each other as adversaries. They share the goal of overcoming the vestiges of earlier confrontation and competition and of strengthening mutual trust and cooperation. The present Act reaffirms the determination of NATO and Russia to give concrete substance to their shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, whole and free, to the benefit of all its peoples. Making this commitment at the highest political level marks the beginning of a fundamentally new relationship between NATO and Russia. They intend to develop, on the basis of common interest, reciprocity and transparency a strong, stable and enduring partnership.

NATO and Russia will seek the widest possible cooperation among participating States of the OSCE with the aim of creating in Europe a common space of security and stability, without dividing lines or spheres of influence limiting the sovereignty of any state.

13 In 2003 krijgt president Kucma een Russisch voorstel tot lidmaatschap van de EuroAziatische Unie, hij weigert. Kort daarna begint Rusland met het bouwen van een dam die het Russische vaste land met een Oekraïens Krim eiland moet verbinden. Oekraïne is verbolgen over de actie.

Eurasian Economic Community (2000–2014) [edit]

Main article: [Eurasian Economic Community](#)

To promote further economic integration and more cooperation, in 2000 Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan established the [Eurasian Economic Community](#) (EurAsEC) which [Uzbekistan](#) joined in 2006. The treaty established a common market for its member states. The Eurasian Economic Community was modelled on the [European Economic Community](#).^[23] The two had a comparable population size of 171 million and 169 million, respectively.

14 Het leidt uiteindelijk na grote druk tot het verdrag van Tuzla in 2003 wat nog maar eens moet voorzien in de integriteit van Oekraïne in haar territoriale wateren. Oekraïne had inmiddels wel al heel vaak afspraken met Rusland gemaakt....

The **Treaty Between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on Cooperation in the Use of the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait** is an agreement on sea and fisheries between Russia and Ukraine entered into force on 23 April 2004.^{[1][2]} It was signed on 24 December 2003 by [President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma](#) and [President of Russia Vladimir Putin](#)^[2] and ratified by both parliaments in April 2004.

In February 2023 the Ukrainian parliament [Verkhovna Rada](#) formally denounced all treaties with Russia on cooperation in the Sea of Azov and in June 2023 Russia's upper house of parliament, the [Federation Council](#), approved a bill denouncing the Russian-Ukrainian treaty. It argued that "because, now, the coasts of the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait come under the sole jurisdiction of the Russian Federation Ukraine has lost its status as a littoral state with respect to these bodies of water."^[3]

Russia recognized Ukrainian sovereignty over Crimea in 1997, but the status of Tuzla Island was not settled and remained a sore spot in [Russia-Ukraine relations](#).^{[2][1]} The [governor of Krasnodar Krai](#) at the time, [Alexsandr Tkachyov](#), stated "...I think that this is land that was bathed in Cossack blood, and therefore it is our sacred land", claiming the peninsula as part of Russia.^[3] Tkachyov had later met with the deputy speaker of the [Russian дума](#), [Vladimir Zhirinovsky](#), with Zhirinovsky claiming that the majority of the Duma backed the Russian claim over Tuzla island.^[4]

Controlling the island would give either country much control over the shipping to the [Sea of Azov](#), and for that reason was seen as a priority for the Ukrainian government.^[2]

On September 9, 2003, Russian authorities began construction on a dam from the [Taman Peninsula](#) towards Tuzla island,^[5] with a number of [Kuban Cossack](#) activists following the construction workers.^[2] It is still disputed what entity in Russia began the construction, with one version of events claiming that local Kuban Cossacks began construction to manage salt water flow to Taman Bay due to issues with breeding fish and erosion. Kyiv newspaper "[Zerkalo nedeli](#)" disputed this claim, instead claiming that it was an attempt by a number of local businessmen and Ukrainian politician [Leonid Hrach](#) to convince Ukraine and Russia to build a bridge over the Kerch strait.^[2] Ukraine has accused Russia of attempting to annex the island, if completed the dam connection would have transformed Tuzla from a Ukrainian island into the tip of Russian mainland, and gave Russia control over the strait's navigable channel.^[6] Russia has dismissed the claim, saying it is merely trying to fight the effects of erosion on the Taman peninsula. Ukraine responded by stationing troops on Tuzla Island.^[1]

15 Er is veel Russische invloed rond de presidentsverkiezingen van 2004 in Oekraïne. Het Kremlin probeert Janukovitsj verkozen te krijgen. Na grote fraude van die laatste en een nieuwe verkiezingsronde wint de pro Europese Joesjenko. Het is tegen het zere been van Rusland.

16 Yuri Lushkov, inmiddels de nummer 2 van Poetins Partij woont een samenkomst bij van een niche groep die een Kharkiv Republiek wil stichten in 2005. Het geeft eens te meer aan Rusland de zaak probeert te destabiliseren.

But Moscow continued to rely on the opposition and even separation of the regions. At the height of the Orange Revolution, the first attempt to separate the south and east was even carried out - a pro-Russian congress of deputies of all levels was held in Severodonetsk, it was attended by an influential politician from Russia at that time, Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov. In turn, the then head of the Donetsk Regional Council, Borys Kolesnikov, directly called for separation from Ukraine: "We propose: to express no confidence in all the highest bodies of state power that violated the law. To create a new southeastern Ukrainian state in the form of a federal republic. Kharkiv will become the capital of the new state, thus the first capital of the independent Ukrainian Republic will be restored," Kolesnikov said. However, it did not come to fruition. At that time, Russia did not interfere with weapons in the affairs of a sovereign state, and no one went to secede without support. To the proposal of "Vyorstka" to talk about this now, Kolesnikov replied: "Thank you, I am not interested" (the Kolesnikov Foundation actively supports the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and the entire cover of his Facebook profile is occupied by a huge Ukrainian flag).

17. In 2007 is er een ontmoeting tussen de Poolse delegatie en het Kremlin. Pools minister Sikorski geeft later aan dat Rusland voorstelde Oekraïne op te delen. Of Polen de provincie Lviv, vroeger Pools grondgebied, niet wil hebben. Alsof het een plakje cake betreft.

Sikorski, who until September served as Poland's foreign minister, was quoted telling U.S. website Politico that Putin made the proposal during Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk's visit to Moscow in 2008 — although he later said some of the interview had been "overinterpreted."

"He wanted us to become participants in this partition of Ukraine ... This was one of the first things that Putin said to my prime minister, Donald Tusk, when he visited Moscow," he was quoted as saying in the interview dated Oct. 19.

"He [Putin] went on to say Ukraine is an artificial country and that Lwow is a Polish city and why don't we just sort it out together," Sikorski was quoted as saying.

Before World War II, Poland's territory included parts of today's western Ukraine, including some major cities such as Lwow, known as Lviv in Ukraine.

Sikorski, who accompanied Tusk on his trip to Moscow, was quoted as saying Tusk did not reply to Putin's suggestion because he knew he was being recorded, but Poland never expressed any interest in joining the Russian operation.

"We made it very, very clear to them — we wanted nothing to do with this," Sikorski was quoted as saying.

So I was not surprised by the recent [article](#) by Ben Judah in Politico, quoting among others Radek Sikorski, the former foreign minister of Poland, who is now speaker of the Sejm, the Polish parliament (full disclosure: both men are friends of mine). Sikorski described Putin telling the then Polish prime minister, Donald Tusk, at a meeting in Moscow that: "Ukraine is an artificial country and that Lwów is a Polish city [...] why don't we just sort it out together? Luckily Tusk didn't answer. He knew he was being recorded."

18. In 2014 heeft Rusland middels knokploegen en nepprotestanten veel onrust veroorzaakt in Oekraïense gebieden zoals Dnipro, Odesa, Sumy, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk. Later zal Russen ook paramilitaire groepen sturen die zich voordoen als 'lokale seperatisten'

Pro-Russian demonstrators in eastern Ukraine mistook a theater for the city hall and stormed the wrong building, a local journalist said, citing the case as evidence that the protesters were not local.

Protesters who took over Kharkiv City Hall over the weekend first broke into the town's opera and ballet theater, but left upon finding a concert hall inside, journalist Vyacheslav Mavrichiev said on his Facebook page.

Ukraine's Interior Minister Arsen Avakov has accused the Kremlin of orchestrating "separatist unrest" in Kharkiv and eastern cities Donetsk and Lugansk, while officials say that many pro-Russia protesters in east Ukraine may in fact be Russian.

On Monday, White House spokesman Jay Carney said there was "strong evidence" to suggest some of these demonstrators were paid and were not local residents."

Former Ukrainian prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko said protesters she saw in Donetsk had a military bearing and "did not look like residents" of the town, Ukraine's Segodnya.ua reported.

The administration building in Kharkiv had been cleared of "separatist" protesters who seized it over the weekend, Avakov said Monday.

19. Vergeten is dat Rusland eigenlijk probeert om opnieuw een Kharkiv Republiek uit de grond te stampen. In 2014 vindt het aanvankelijk burgemeester Kernes aan zijn kant. Doel is

dat Janukovitsj na zijn vlucht uit Kyiv daar de Kharkiv Republiek kan uitroepen.

The **Kharkov People's Republic** (also known as the **Kharkiv People's Republic**) (Russian: Харьковская Народная Республика) was a short-lived **self proclaimed quasi-state** in **Kharkiv, Ukraine**.^[5]

The flag is still used by pro-Russian separatists, along with the **new one** (in which they differ by the color of the stripe above, the republican is green and the occupation is purple), proclaiming that the republic will be reconstituted with the help from Russia.

References [\[change | change source \]](#)

Kharkiv People's Republic
Харьковская Народная Республика (Russian)
Khar'kovskaya Narodnaya Respublika



20. Het loopt anders, Kernes bedenkt zich aan switcht van kamp. Kharkiv dat een dag onder controle is van door Rusland gestuurde 'protestanten' is weer Oekraïens, Janukovitsj vlucht naar Rusland.

KHARKIV, Ukraine -- Kharkiv Mayor Hennadiy Kernes, who heads Ukraine's second largest city with more than 1.5 million people, walks into his vast office from the back door this week, stares at his Apple computer screen and says "Let's start."

It's been a couple of weeks since the controversial mayor made a jarring shift from being an ardent supporter of overthrown President Viktor Yanukovich to leader of a separatist movement and finally to acceptance of the new government.

Now he says that the Yanukovich era is history.

"I didn't say he is the past, I said he is the history, a historical lesson that should be learned," the mayor explained.

Until the switch, Kernes had often been accused of organizing AntiMaidan demonstrations, as well as squads of titushki, the government-hired thugs who did the dirty work at protests, such as provocations and ambushes against EuroMaidan supporters.

21. Een kleine terugkeer naar puntje 13, de EuroAziatischeUnie. Rusland wilde heel graag dat Oekraïne daarbij kwam hoewel Kuchma dus geweigerd had. Janukovitsj had in 2010 ineens een campagne gevoerd dat hij lid van de EU wilde worden.

22. Janukovitsj cancelde het toetreden tot de EU eind 2013, maar belangrijker (en vaak vergeten!) hij stuurde vrijwel meteen aan op toetreding van de EuroAziatischeUnie. Dat zou de deur naar de EU voorgoed dichtgooien en Oekraïne economisch aan Rusland binden.

Ukraine and the unravelling of Eurasia

On 27 July 2013 Vladimir Putin visited Kiev to celebrate the 1025th anniversary of the 'Christening of Russia' in Crimea by Vladimir the Great, Grand Prince of Kiev, nicknamed 'the Fair Sun' (*Krasno Solnyshko*). Putin made an impromptu appearance at a conference on 'Orthodox-Slavic values – the foundation of Ukraine's civilisational choice' organised by Viktor Medvedchuk, a Ukrainian politician to whose daughter Putin is godfather. There, Putin announced that Russians and Ukrainians are 'one nation' and that throughout the vagaries of history the 'idea of unity between the western and eastern Rus [i.e. Ukraine and Russia] always lived on both in the east and west of the lands where our nation lived'. He then extolled the benefits of Ukraine's inclusion in the Russian empire and USSR, citing a whole array of Soviet-era statistics.²⁸

Two weeks later Russia fired a warning shot across Ukraine's bows when it blocked virtually all Ukrainian exports to Russia, thereby pressurising Ukraine not to sign the pending Association Agreement with the EU. This sparked off a trade and diplomatic war, followed by a revolution in Kiev, Russia's occupation and annexation of Crimea, and a proxy war in Eastern Ukraine which within less than a year left thousands of people dead. The crisis tragically acquired an even greater international dimension when, on 17 July 2014, a civilian airliner carrying 298 foreign nationals from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur was shot down with the loss of all on board.

The Eurasian Economic Union was to a large degree conceived and designed to attract Ukraine. Indeed at times it has seemed that the Eurasian project is as much, if not more, about Ukraine than about Eurasia. Ukraine occupies a central place in Russia's political psyche. The debate on whether Ukraine is a separate country or *kraiina* ('borderlands') of Greater Russia, and whether to refer to it as 'Ukraine' or 'the Ukraine' (as the borderlands, i.e. part of a country) is so intense that it can sour friendships and family relations in Russia.²⁹

23. Dat heel veel Oekraïners geen zin hadden om via de EuroAziatischeUnie weer aan Rusland vast te zitten moge duidelijk zijn. Men zag in Oekraïne ook hoe het Belarus verging dat onder druk van Rusland stukje bij beetje haar federale integriteit opgaf, mede dankzij de EAU.

24. Rusland lanceerde het Uniestaat Model voor Belarus waarin het via politieke weg (verdragen) en economische druk uiteindelijk een veredelde provincie van Rusland is. Het is de nachtmerrie voor heel veel Oekraïners.

Union State

Article [Talk](#)

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This article is about the post-Soviet organization. For the 19th-century rump state, see [Ur division](#), see [Union territory \(disambiguation\)](#). For other, see [Union \(disambiguation\)](#). Not to be confused with [State of the Union](#) or [Union State Bank \(disambiguation\)](#).

The **Union State**,^[b] or **Union State of Russia and Belarus**,^[c] is a [supranational union](#) consisting of [Belarus](#) and [Russia](#), with the stated aim of deepening the relationship between the two states through integration in economic and defence policy.^{[6][7]} Originally, the Union State aimed to create a [confederation](#); however, both countries currently retain their independence.^[8]

The Union State is based on a previous international treaty between Russia and Belarus^[9] made on 2 April 1997.^[10] Although it consists of only Russia and Belarus, other countries are allowed to join.^[7] The supranational union is ruled through the Supreme State Council^[11] and other governing bodies.^[12] As of 2024, the current president of the Supreme State Council of the Union is [Alexander Lukashenko](#), who has held the position since 2000.^[13] The present goal of the Union State mainly focuses on economic integration,^[14] taxation,^[15] and integration of defence and intelligence apparatus.^[16]

25/25 Kortom Rusland probeert al sinds de onafhankelijkheid van Oekraïne op allerlei manieren aan het grondgebied van Oekraïne te knagen, middels revoluties, coups, bouwprojecten, militaire invallen en voorstellen aan buurlanden van Oekraïne. Met verdragen bedondert het de boel.

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