

Pekka Kallioniemi @P\_Kallioniemi Feb 6, 2024 - 22 tweets - P\_Kallioniemi/status/1754825575082897442

In today's #vatniksoup, I'll discuss about X's massive problem with social media manipulation, paid shills, bots, and trolls.

Due to the upcoming US election in Nov 2024 and Elon's disregard of the problem, X is seeing more trolls and bots than ever before.

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Like all other social media platforms, pre-Elon Twitter was struggling with a massive problem with automated accounts (bots) and paid shills (trolls). But it was doing MUCH better than other platforms, and the company actually had one of the best safety teams around.

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
	2020	2021
Facebook	96.53%	98.52%
Twitter	74.23%	83.43%
Instagram	91.80%	96.01%
TikTok	99.69%	84.77%
VKontakte		99.96%
YouTube	97.17%	92.38%




One of Elon's early broken promises was that if his bid for Twitter succeeds, the team will "defeat the spam bots or die trying!" He also promised to "authenticate all real humans". Of course, none of this happened, and the changes he made only made trolls more effective.




Today, there's probably more active troll farms than ever before. And it has become a lucrative business available for anyone and in every language. For example, China, Russia, India, Philippines, Nigeria, Israel and Ghana offer extensive social media manipulation services.









The services offered range from unsophisticated like automatically registered accounts, to more sophisticated like manually registered & hacked accounts that can then be padded with custom, often political, content. Other factors include age & verification of the account(s). 5/21

automatically are the cheapest but also the least reliable, while accounts that are registered manually are more reliable but also more expensive, as are genuine accounts that have been hacked.

#### Automatically registered

accounts – these accounts are registered using programs designed for the purpose and are usually not very sophisticated.

- Manually registered accounts these accounts are registered by human operators and can often be padded with custom content.
- Hacked accounts these are accounts that belong to real people whose credentials have been hacked or stolen. Because of their genuine historical record hacked accounts are better at circumventing platform safeguards. Hacked accounts are sometimes seen as consumables for collecting information about users, or as part of a short-term targeting scheme, because the legitimate owner can retake control of the account. However, since the real owners sometimes lack the will and ability to regain access, such accounts sometimes remain under the control of malicious users.

### Account verification

Social media accounts can be verified by phone and by e-mail. Verified accounts are more expensive, but less likely to be blocked. The quality of the verification process is also a price factor – manual verification is more reliable, while automatically verified accounts are at greater risk of being blocked and the work done through these accounts (likes, comments etc.) deleted.

### Content

The more content provided for a maliciously created account the more realistic it will look. Depending on the task an account is required to perform, a higher level of perceived authenticity can be more or less desirable. A basic account is usually sold in four set categories:

- a. accounts with no content
- b. accounts with a profile picture
- c. accounts with a profile picture and a few photos
- d. accounts with a profile picture, photos, and a range of posts

In addition to these general bulk categories more advanced services offer custom-made, highly-developed accounts that are nearly impossible to differentiate from genuine accounts.

#### Account age

The history of an account, its age, is important for trust and credibility. The market offers accounts with a wide range of ages – from days to 7+ years old. The older the account, the more expensive it is, as an old account is less likely to be detected as malicious.

Suppliers of these services also offer automation software, that can be used to control bulk subscriptions, likes, shares and follows. They can also be used to post comments en masse in a manner that they can't be detected by social media platforms.

### Automation software

Suppliers selling mid- to low-range services use automation software. To further our understanding of the tools available we conducted an in-depth assessment of one of the most popular software packages for social media manipulation. This software package is marketed from a public web page that offers a comprehensive knowledgebase, video tutorials, and 24/7 support to help their customers use their software as effectively as possible. The development team consists of about 20 people and the business has an official account at a Russian bank. Most of their marketing activities are aimed at the private market.

This software package comes with two modes – an 'assist mode' and a 'technical mode'. The 'assist mode' allows the purchaser to ensure that the account controlled by the software operates within credible parameters to keep the account from being banned. It is likely that developers have reverse engineered the social media companies' defense protocols to increase the survivability of the assisted accounts. The 'technical mode' is used to maintain and control accounts, as well as to gather information (usually from competitors' accounts).


The technical features of the software package include:

- Account registration
- Data collection from target social media accounts

- Assessment of collected data based on meta-data and search queries
- Execution of bulk subscriptions, likes, and follows – the software can predict the likelihood of a genuine account liking or following another account in return based on their historical behavior
- Posting comments en masse and mass messaging; a large number of automated accounts and long waiting periods are required if such operations are to avoid detection by social media platforms

Such software packages rely on a number of subcontractors. Some of these subcontractors provide accounts, while others provide the infrastructure needed to register, verify, and maintain them, and to reduce the risk of detection, such as mobile proxies and virtual sim-cards, and cloud hosting.

We identified two other developers who provide software of similar quality and scope (with 24/7 support and a wide range of functions) and a number of small-scale providers who offer cheaper and simpler services. Although the service providers we have been able to identify are based in a variety of countries, the three main software developers and the bulk of infrastructure maintenance services are Russian entities and many of them operate openly from Russia.




The SSU said it seized two sets of GSM gateways, 3,000 SIM cards, laptops, and accounting records. GSM gateways are equipment that allows people to use SIM cards to connect to networks outside the default network they're meant to be connected to. They're popular tools for hackers and other cyber criminals, who can use them to manage several phone numbers, and to connect to Voice Over IP, or VoIP networks. The photos of the bust show dozens of GSM gateways stuffed with blurred SIM cards.



IMAGE: UKRAINE SECURITY SERVICES PHOTO.

The most common strategy on social media manipulation is the Russian style of online propaganda, "Firehose of falsehood", which prioritizes quantity over quality, and tries to overwhelm any competing narratives on the topic. This strategy is now being used by most countries.

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# The Firehose of Falsehood: the Russian style of propaganda for an age of information abundance.


- High volume and multi-channel approach
- Shameless in its willingness to broadcast lies
- No commitment to, or requirement for consistency
- Rapid, continuous and repetitive messaging
- · Point is not to persuade but to confuse and overwhelm
- Assumes a low trust environment and lowers it further
- Number of arguments matters more than their quality
- Drown out competing messages through sheer volume

Another common approach of troll farms is called "astroturfing". This deceptive practice tries to present an orchestrated marketing or PR campaign so that it seems "grassroots" and organic. In addition to troll farms, astroturfing is used by companies and brands.




Coordinated inauthentic behaviours online are becoming a more serious problem throughout the world. One common type of manipulative behaviour is astroturfing. It happens when an entity artificially creates an impression of widespread support for a product, policy, or concept, when in reality only limited support exists. Online astroturfing is often considered to be just like any other coordinated inauthentic behaviour; with considerable discussion focusing on how it aggravates the spread of fake news and disinformation. This paper shows that astroturfing creates additional problems for social media platforms and the online environment in general. The practice of astroturfing exploits our natural tendency to conform to what the crowd does; and because of the importance of conformity in our decision-making process, the negative consequences brought about by astroturfing can be much more far-reaching and alarming than just the spread of disinformation.





Online manipulation campaigns often focus on big events, such as elections. It's very difficult to control the flow of information, and that's why authoritarian regimes often focus on limiting the Internet rather than trying to fight the swarm of trolls and their campaigns.



This is why the online information war can be considered asymmetric - Western democracies and especially the US hold free speech in high regard, whereas the authoritarian and totalitarian regimes see them as a threat and will do anything to limit it.





Let's look at the upcoming US presidential elections - Today, these paid shills swarm any topic revolving around Joe Biden, Nikki Haley, Donald Trump, and Tucker Carlson. They are also promoting ideas of a civil war in the US, and the secession of Texas.

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Now, there are some giveaway signs for trolls, but they're not bulletproof. Researchers have found that Russian troll farms often stop working during Russian holidays. These accounts also use culture-specific talking points, like "warm water ports" in the case of Texas.


### 12/21

An analysis of the accounts' activity by the Clemson Media Forensics Hub and ProPublica found they posted at defined times consistent with the IRA workday, were created in the same time frame and posted similar or identical text, photos and videos across accounts and platforms. Posts from Twitter accounts in the network dropped off on weekends and Russian holidays, suggesting the posters had regular work schedules.



And with the help of generative AI interfaces like ChatGPT, we'll see less and less bad grammar in the future. AI solutions also allow auto-generation of content, as you can see by using the search term "as it goes against OpenAI's use case policy".

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But not all troll farms are of course Russian, and not all of them focus solely on the West. They've been used extensively in the elections in the Arab world, and even firebrand pastors, dentists, pet food businesses and health gurus have utilized them to gain popularity.

30 countries that pay pro-government commentators:					
Azerbaijan	Bahrain	Belarus			
China	Cuba	Ecuador			
Egypt	Ethiopia	The Gambia			
Iran	Kazakhstan	Kenya			
Kyrgzstan	Malaysia	Mexico			
Morocco	Myanmar	Philippines			
Russia	Rwanda	Saudi Arabia			
Sudan	Syria	Thailand			
Turkey	Ukraine	United Arab Emirates			
Uzbekisatn	Venezuela	Vietnam			



Troll farms are also used to artificially bloat accounts that spread specific narratives. For example, @JoeyMannarinoUS was steadily losing followers until he had a big spike after mid-Jan 2024. This huge increase is probably as fake as his hairline.





Kim Dotcom 🤣 @KimDotcom

I just paid 1420 people on Cashrain.com for promoting a tweet I made yesterday. Congrats to the jackpot winners. Cashrain makes it easy to amplify your social media 🚁

### Active Cashrain is over 🎉


\$1.99K | (18 BCH) have been rained to 1420 winners!







In addition to being difficult to counter, social media manipulation is also extremely cheap. After it became a global phenomenon and business, the price of buying likes, shares and comments has become a viable and cheap strategy for any government or organization.



As you may have noticed, there's an ongoing manipulation campaign that focuses heavily on endorsing Trump to become the next president of the US. I'd imagine, that this would be supported by troll farms in most authoritarian regimes, including the Kremlin and the CCP.



### **BUSINESS INSIDER**


#### POLITICS

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## China meddled in the 2022 election because it figured Biden wouldn't retaliate: US intel report

Natalie Musumeci Dec 19, 2023, 8:41 PM GMT+2

→ Share □ Save




- China tried to meddle in the 2022 United States midterm elections, a US intelligence report said.
- Beijing wasn't worried about retaliation from the Biden administration, the report found.
- The Chinese government "tacitly approved efforts" to influence midterm races last year, intel revealed.

So, expect to see much more "Texian patriots", BBQ dads, football fans, concerned citizens, warm water port enjoyers, "unvaxxed mothers/wives", free speech advocates and humble Christians, and then watch them disappear after the US election in Nov 2024.



And all this is of course no problem to @elonmusk (who has me muted btw). He's showed strong opposition to Biden's policies, and the millions of bots buying blue and gold ticks probably keep his platform afloat.

So, don't expect many changes in the near future.






### Ron Filipkowski 🤣 @RonFilipkowski

Elon made exactly 100 posts on here since yesterday including replies that began at 12:18 AM ET on Saturday and continued until 5:08 AM ET on Sunday. They seemed to be pretty much uninterrupted for 29 hours straight and pretty much every major far-right account was engaged with.

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13:41 · 04 Feb 24 · 634K Views





Now, there are some accounts that try to find patterns in usernames, behavior, etc. This is important work, but one should remember that there are probably thousands of troll farms around the world, some more sophisticated than others, making them difficult...



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BY DEEN FREELON Hussman School of Journalism and Media, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA	TETYANA LOKOT School of Communications, Dublin Ci University, Ireland	ty							

...to detect without proper tools. Twitter had these tools before, but Elon conveniently removed them, probably to make more money and to prevent researchers from doing deep dives on the data. But you can still buy the full toolset for around 2,5 million USD annually.



Sources:

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The Soup Central The Soup Central gives you in-depth knowledge on disinformation, bad actors and information operations. https://www.youtube.com/@TheSoupCentral/videos

## \*literal russian propaganda\* Elon musk:



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